Performance, embodiment, and nervous sympathy in Maria Edgeworth’s Harrington by Bundock, C
  1 
   
 
 
Performance, Embodiment, and Nervous Sympathy in Maria Edgeworth’s Harrington 
Christopher Bundock (University of Essex) 
“Diseases of the nerves are essentially disorders of sympathy”   
— Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization 
I: Gut Feelings  
 “I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one,” observes Edmund 
Burke in his Enquiry, “in the real misfortunes and pains of others; for let the affection be what it 
will in appearance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if on the contrary it induces us to ap-
proach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this case I conceive we must have a delight or 
pleasure of some species or other in contemplating objects of this kind.”1 Midway through Maria 
Edgeworth’s novel Harrington (1817) we encounter precisely such an object of perverse attrac-
tion: a painting titled The Dentition of the Jew on auction at Christie’s. The image alludes to the 
tale of a Jew’s teeth extracted by King John’s order, a punishment that might be specially chosen 
to express contempt for the Jew’s usurious “bite.”2 Rather than offer a detailed description of the 
painting, the text presents us with the reaction of the titular Harrington: “the sight struck me with 
such associated feelings of horror that I started back, exclaiming with vehement gestures, ‘I can-
not bear it! I cannot bear that picture!’”3 Despite the appalling subject matter and Harrington’s 
understandable disgust, however, the painting attracts attention. In the auction, it becomes the 
object of a bidding war won, at great cost, by a Jewish gentleman and Harrington’s future father-
in-law, Mr. Montenero. As Harrington attempts to collect himself, “Mr. Montenero, with the 
greatest kindness of manner and with friendly presence of mind, said he remembered well having 
felt actually sick at the sight of certain pictures” (186). 
 Reflecting on this scene, Jeffrey Cass argues that “Harrington employs…painting as an 
ideological ekphrasis that glosses the novel’s symbolic action…. The battle over [The Dentition 
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of the Jew’s] ownership between the Jew Montenero and Lady Brantefield externalizes Edge-
worth’s internal struggles regarding the place and presence of Jews within her own life and 
thought.”4 While this moment certainly can function allegorically for problems of appropriation 
and representation in Edgeworth’s oeuvre more broadly, it also invites us to consider the com-
plex of pain, sympathy, and embodiment that complicates relationships in the novel, especially 
between Jews and gentiles. Montenero, by his own admission, struggles to “digest” images of 
violence—“he remembered well having felt actually sick”—just as Harrington viscerally recoils 
from The Dentition of the Jew. In drawing attention to the mouth, the painting invites us to think 
more literally about taste and the embodiment of aesthetic judgement. It also invites us to think 
about Jewish dietary law. Maimonides, in an effort to explain the prohibition on pork in Leviti-
cus, argues that the “habits and…food” of pigs “are very dirty and loathsome.”5 Is Harrington 
bonding with his Jewish acquaintance by acquiring something like the gustatory repugnance that, 
for Maimonides, grounds kosher practices? Has Harrington’s turning stomach—the most sensi-
tive and sympathetic organ, according to some physicians of the time—already started to con-
vert?6 In feeling something like nausea in this moment, Harrington’s taste in art aligns with Mon-
tenero’s and draws the two closer together at both a cultural and alimentary level. 
As this novel makes particularly clear, Harrington’s sympathy with—and as we will see 
later, his mother’s antipathy to—Jewish others is both social and physiological. Instead of 
“changing minds” through reasoned conversation, the text explores how change emerges in the 
space between affective and emotional resonances, in the subject’s reckoning with his or her own 
nervous system. In the course of so doing, sympathy is revealed as both poison and cure for so-
cial and political conflict. Michael Ragussis is surely correct that “[t]he exaggerated poles of 
Harrington’s feelings suggest that…the Jew functions purely as a figure of the imagination, even 
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as a fetish, and that both of Harrington’s responses, whether of dread or desire, are forms of 
‘Jewish insanity.’”7 Yet the usual approaches to Harrington’s “Jewish insanity,” including Ra-
gussis’s own, overlook how it takes shape through his body and, specifically, in a pre-reflective, 
or affective, register. Harrington’s is a corporeal as much as an intellectual disorder, one that is, 
by turns, exacerbated and improved by sympathy. Together with his mother, father, and his ro-
mantic interest, Berenice, the text offers us several case studies in the material anatomy of the 
imagination. Thinking sympathy through anatomy significantly reframes sympathy’s social and 
political implications. That is, the text not only raises questions about how Jewish difference 
troubles the English state; in its experimentation with how nervous materiality constitutes a sub-
ject’s world, how the quasi-theatrical performance of the body enacts selfhood, it shifts the ethi-
cal and political ground of these problems to what William Connolly calls “the infrasensible di-
mension of politics.”8 This promises a variety of ways to explore class, racial, religious, and cul-
tural difference that go beyond any ideology analysis that remains focused only on forms of re-
flective consciousness and the repressions thereof. In this novel, ideology shapes not only con-
cepts but bodies themselves, while bodies, in turn, are the nervous ground of the social and polit-
ical. 
In the text’s own language, Harrington’s confusion of attraction and repulsion stems from 
his “morbid sensibility” (74), a nervous illness he inherits from his mother. It is a disease Har-
rington at some level is keen to preserve rather than remedy, and this for at least two reasons. 
First, he owes to this condition the spontaneous alignment of his tastes with Jewish characters—
as noted above, with Mr. Montenero and, discussed below, with Berenice. Harrington’s condi-
tion predisposes him to feeling the discomfort of those to whom he is attracted, such that this be-
comes the first movement in the formation of intimacy. Second, it is this visceral discomfort that 
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ostensibly defends against threats of dissimulation, affectation, and fake feeling. As we will see, 
Harrington’s anti-Semitism is rooted in a confusion of feelings about Jews. This confusion is the 
fruit of a deliberate lie that, early in his life, takes hold of Harrington’s imagination—and also, as 
it turns out, of his body. It is not surprising, then, that as an adult Harrington is especially con-
cerned to police real from fake feeling. This becomes especially urgent in a text where theatre 
plays a significant role in the plot: acting extends beyond the stage and, in Harrington’s case, 
even beyond conscious intention. Hence, the peculiar voltage of affects—such as disgust—seem 
to promise Harrington clarity and authenticity in a world too often emotionally fraudulent. Yet if 
Harrington’s “morbid sensibility” makes the very intertwining of sensoria possible, this does not 
in fact resolve the problem of authenticity or root sympathy in some sort of pre-political biology. 
The Gothic plot of the novel exposes how, in fact, even the most earnest performances of the 
self, even the most somatic harmonies between characters, are delusional. Neither Harrington nor 
Berenice turn out to be what they seem. As a result, the sympathy between them, despite its 
physiological manifestation, proves phantasmatic. 
II: Faking It and Making It 
 Harrington’s physical aversion to The Dentition of the Jew is complicated by the novel’s 
treatment of sympathy and nervous pathology. Written in response to a letter from a young Jew-
ish-American woman, Rachel Mordecai, who criticized Edgeworth’s unflattering portrayals of 
Jews in Castle Rackrent (1800), Belinda (1801), and The Absentee (1812), Harrington investi-
gates the origins of the title character’s anti-Semitism and his eventual change of heart brought 
about through sympathetic interactions with several benevolent and respectable Jewish charac-
ters, including the unjustly maligned Jacob, the impressive professor Israel Lyons, and most sig-
nificantly the noble, generous Mr. Montenero, a Spanish Jew, and his lovely daughter, Berenice.9 
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Harrington’s eventual attraction to all things Jewish—not least Berenice—reads, however, less 
like the elimination of anti-Semitism and more like an inversion that preserves the core of affec-
tive hostility. At one level, certainly, Harrington’s anti-Semitism gives way to philo-Semitism. 
Yet if these seem like polar opposites, the novel suggests that they are in fact uncanny versions 
of each other. While the values have inverted, upon his “conversion”—that is, falling in love 
with Berenice—Harrington is no less obsessive than he ever was. Harrington’s attraction to Ber-
enice gathers force, in fact, by recycling his initial revulsion. Rather than merely overcoming his 
terror and disgust, his interest in Berenice is intensified by the sickness he continues to feel in the 
company of Jews. And continue to feel sick he does. The mere mention of the old clothes man, 
Simon, for whom Harrington conceived a phobia years earlier as a child, is enough to cast him 
“in agonies” (177). 
 Harrington’s scrambled sympathy comes into focus when he slowly contracts Berenice’s 
sense of disgust upon witnessing a performance of The Merchant of Venice. Harrington’s attrac-
tion to Berenice intensifies in proportion to her revulsion in response to the play. Initially, Har-
rington is mesmerized by Charles Macklin’s performance: “Shylock appeared—I forgot every-
thing but him” (136). However, he soon finds another drama more enthralling: “I heard a soft 
low sigh near me. I looked and saw the Jewess…. I had for the first time a full view of her face, 
and of her countenance of great sensibility, painfully, proudly repressed” (136). At her request he 
places himself “so as to screen her from observation during the whole next act. But now” he con-
fesses, 
my pleasure in the play was over. I could no longer enjoy Macklin’s in 
comparable acting; I was so apprehensive of the pain which it must give 
the young Jewess. At every stroke, characteristic of the skillful actor or the 
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master poet, I felt a strange mixture of admiration and regret. I almost 
wished that Shakespeare had not written or Macklin had not acted the part 
so powerfully. My imagination formed such a strong conception of the 
pain the Jewess was feeling, and my inverted sympathy, if I may so call it, 
so overpowered my direct and natural feelings, that at every fresh develop-
ment of the Jew’s villainy I shrunk as though I had myself been a Jew. 
(137)  
Harrington is moved by Berenice’s distress, indeed, is transported into a profound oneness with 
her: “I now saw and heard the play,” he declares, “solely with reference to her feelings” (139). 
Harrington’s “direct and natural feelings” of pleasure in the play and its performance are, in 
other words, contaminated. The “strange mixture of admiration and regret” anticipates his “in-
verted sympathy,” by which he could mean shifting allegiance from Christian to Jewish charac-
ters in the play or, more broadly, that the very source of enjoyment has become a source of dis-
comfort and that his “admiration” for Shakespeare morphs into “regret.”10 But this marks not 
merely a change in Harrington’s feelings: his ambivalence stems from “a kind of conversion” to 
Judaism.11 
 This is to take sympathy rather further than that concept normally allows. According to 
Adam Smith, for instance, sympathy attunes subjects to each other while also stressing the differ-
ence in (emotional) repetition: 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form 
no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what 
we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon 
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the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never in-
form us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us be-
yond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form 
any conception of what are his sensations.12 
The imagination produces a virtual copy, or narrative, of another’s experience. As Vivasvan Soni 
argues, “it would be a mistake to think that sympathy, for Smith, is an unmediated relation to the 
feelings of others. Sym-pathy must not be confused with tele-pathy or affective contagion.”13 
And yet precisely such “affective contagion” seems to have infected Harrington. The text sug-
gests he has been grafted onto and shares Berenice’s sensorium. His sympathy with her is so in-
tense that he experiences the play “solely with reference to her feelings.” He does not merely feel 
for her but as her—“as though [he] had [himself] been a Jew.” In this respect, he embodies a ma-
terial sympathy of the sort that fascinated earlier thinkers like Kenelm Digby, Francis Bacon, and 
David Hume, and that evolved into the explanation in the eighteenth century for how bodily or-
gans communicate with each other.14 So, when Michael Scrivener says that “Harrington sees 
Shakespeare’s play through ‘Jewish’ eyes” (120) in this moment, we should take that somewhat 
more than figuratively if not totally literally. With these Jewish eyes, his tastes also begin to mu-
tate. Eventually, when overcome with nausea at the thought of Shylock carving out a pound of 
Antonio’s living flesh, Harrington knows he is in love.  
In Harrington’s actions and reactions, we confront sympathy’s uncanny double. This per-
verse sympathy lingers below the surface of the prevailing, eighteenth-century understanding of 
the concept. “In providing a scientific basis for linking ‘sense’ with ‘consensus’…the culture of 
sensibility [in the eighteenth century] promoted an image of society held together by bonds of 
feeling.”15 For Smith, sympathy is crucial for the formulation of society, for fostering the basic 
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interest in and underwriting the reality of other minds. Referencing Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments in Practical Education, the Edgeworths note that “[n]o theory was ever developed 
with more ingenious elegance, than that which deduces all our moral sentiments from sympathy. 
The direct influence of sympathy upon all social beings is sufficiently obvious, and we immedi-
ately perceive its necessary connexion with compassion, friendship, and benevolence.”16 Yet the 
Edgeworths are quick to add qualifications and cautions: “we must at the same time perceive, 
that a being endowed with the most exquisite sympathy must, without the assistance and educa-
tion of reason, be, if not equally incapable of social intercourse, far more dangerous to the happi-
ness of society.”17  
Thinkers both before and after Smith touched on these dangers, gesturing toward socially 
adverse potentialities within sympathy—potentialities that are, in Harrington, afforded espe-
cially bold expression. In “A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm,” Anthony Ashley Cooper suggests 
that “[we] may with good reason call every Passion Panic which is rais’d in a Multitude, and 
convey’d by Aspect, or as it were by Contact, or Sympathy.”18 Sympathy might also be selective 
or misdirected, as in the case of a child who is more concerned with his caterpillar than his sis-
ter.19  Hume notes, moreover, that sympathy tends to develop between people who are already 
similar to each other: “We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons re-
mote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with for-
eigners.”20 This would seem rather to limit the very extroversion sympathy is supposed to enable. 
Finally, sympathy might move us to “transgress the boundaries of prudence”—thereby under-
mining the work of political economy itself—and actually act immorally from a practical-philo-
sophical standpoint.21 As Nancy Yousef remarks, it is indeed “disturbing” to find in Hume that 
while we “cannot help but perceive the other’s grief” there are occasions where he insists that we 
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are “not necessarily moved to respond” and that “sometimes I ought (in the service of justice!) to 
resist the inclination to respond.”22 Hence, Angelina Del Balzo is right to see expressed in Har-
rington specifically “an ambivalence about the progressive potential of sympathy” that was per-
vasive in the writing and thought of the period.23 
The novel also implants sympathy in the body in ways that align with contemporary med-
ical thought. While Smith stresses the imagination’s role in mediating sympathy through repre-
sentational abstraction, the physician Robert Whytt suggests that sympathy involves a more im-
mediate commingling of nervous systems: 
there is a remarkable sympathy, by means of the nerves, between the vari-
ous parts of the body; and now it appears that there is a still more wonder-
ful sympathy between the nervous system of different persons, whence 
various motions and morbid symptoms are often transferred from one to 
another, without any corporeal contact or infection. In these cases, the im-
pression made upon the mind or sensorium commune by seeing others in a 
disordered state, raises, by means of the nerves, such motions or changes 
in certain parts of the body as to produce similar affections in them: and 
hence it is, that the sight of only one person vomiting has often excited the 
same action in others;…and that convulsive disorders are caught by look-
ing on those who are affected with them.24 
The operative faculty or power here is not the “imagination” but the “nerves.” While there is no 
obvious contact between bodies, feeling propagates organically, at a level below consciousness. 
Whytt’s thinking here about interpersonal sympathy is modelled on his thinking about internal, 
bodily sympathy.25 In Janis McLarren Caldwell’s words, Whytt traces the movement from “the 
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theory of physiologic sympathy” to “social sympathy.”26 Physiologic sympathy bypasses cogni-
tion, or Smith’s “conceiving” mind. Instead of deliberately figuring oneself in the place of an-
other, a resonance takes hold “between the nervous system of different persons.” Hume also ges-
tures toward this pre-reflective, pre-linguistic communication when, anticipating the Aeolian 
harp of later Romantic poetry, he writes, “[a]s in strings equally wound up, the motion of the one 
communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and 
beget correspondent movements in every human creature.”27 Such correspondent movements re-
quire no higher-order thinking as they cascade over or penetrate bodies like a physical force.28  
 The abstraction of Smith’s imagination and the materiality of Whytt’s nerves represent an 
early stage in the fragmentation of the imagination that has led, in recent years, to critical con-
flicts. By looking closely at medical, scientific, and philosophical contexts, Richard Sha argues 
that in these debates the Romantic imagination has been badly misrepresented, even by those 
who would come to its defense. He demonstrates how materialist and idealist disputes about the 
nature of the imagination are exacerbated by ignoring the imagination’s ontological complexity 
in the eighteenth century. More specifically, Sha thinks that if in materialist readings of Romanti-
cism “the imagination has been tarred with the brush of ideological escapism” and aligned with 
“the immateriality of consciousness,” this characterization stems—ironically—from an inade-
quate attention to history, a domain typically claimed by “materialists.”29 For instance, that the 
imagination could be, as John Haygarth argued in 1800,  “a cause” and “a cure of disorders of 
the body,” suggests that for eighteenth and early nineteenth-century thinkers, the imagination is 
continuous with organic life.30 In Sha’s words, “[b]y failing to give the physiology of the imagi-
nation adequate attention, critics have missed how the imagination already has been physiologi-
cally imagined as having absorbed the material into the ideal.”31 
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 Sha’s argument suggests that the recent turn to affect in literary and cultural studies might 
be more accurately understood as the return of the “physiological imagination.” “The turn to af-
fect,” says Patricia T. Clough, involves a focus on the “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and 
matter generally.”32 Affects are embodied experiences that do not have the conceptual clarity or 
definition of emotions. In Rei Terada’s words, “by emotion we usually mean a psychological, at 
least minimally interpretive experience whose physiological aspect is affect.”33 Akin to drives 
but with “greater freedom…with respect to object,” affects compose and shape our capacity for 
experiences, for acting and being acted on.34 Hence, affect “is the name we give to those 
forces—visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital 
forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought 
and extension.”35 While affects operate pre-reflectively, they do not exclude the imagination but 
rather, in ways that seem to echo Sha’s analysis, incorporate a non-conscious imagination into 
the nervous system itself.36 Hence, for Charles Altieri, “[a]ffects are immediate modes of sensual 
responsiveness to the world characterized by an accompanying imaginative dimension.”37 One 
result from this is that being moved in certain instances might generate conflicts between embod-
ied affects, measured as “intensity,” and interpretive emotions.38 
 Certainly, Harrington’s responses to The Dentition of the Jew and The Merchant of Ven-
ice are intense and visceral. What is strange, though, is how his affective aversions prime his ro-
mantic attraction, suggesting that these levels of response are linked though the nature of influ-
ence complex, even perverse. Hume, for instance, takes the common-sense view that we love 
what is attractive and desirable. As he says, “the sensation [of love] is always agreeable.”39 Ha-
tred, in diametric opposition, is rooted in feeling “uneasy.”40 “Tis plain, that, according as the 
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impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise toward the per-
son, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression.”41 Building on this logic, Smith sug-
gests that disgust renders sympathy impossible or is sympathy’s affective antithesis. “We are,” 
for example, “disgusted with that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon our 
compassion with sighs and tears and importunate lamentations.”42 Socially and politically, dis-
gust has served as “a means of reinforcing the boundaries between self and ‘contaminating’ oth-
ers that has perpetuated racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and misogyny.”43 And yet, as Wil-
liam Ian Miller argues, disgust retains a latent, attracting power: “The disgusting is an insistent 
feature of the lurid and the sensational, informed as these are by sex, violence, horror, and the 
violation of norms of modesty and decorum. And even as the disgusting repels, it rarely does so 
without also capturing our attention.”44 Like the perverse interest Burke notes that we have in 
others’ pain, disgust is a more complex and ambivalent reaction than its immediacy might sug-
gest. Whether understood as a force that organizes appetites or as a force of repression, disgust 
retains a secret proximity to desire. “Love as we know it involves a very particular relation to 
certain aspects of the disgusting,” says Miller.45 Thus, Harrington’s attraction to Berenice is 
strangely amplified and intensified by anti-Semitism. His love borrows from his erstwhile abhor-
rence by just slightly modifying the conditions under which Judaism gives rise to that feeling: 
Berenice’s traumatization and Harrington’s vicarious experience thereof in the playhouse means 
that anti-Semitism plays an important part in suturing them together. Their co-suffering is what 
generates intimacy. Harrington’s bond to her is cinched by the same fibers along which he feels 
her degradation, and feels it as his own. Ragussis notices this counterintuitive economy of feel-
ing too when he says “Berenice’s pain at the performance apparently provokes a kind of sexual 
arousal in the hero.”46 Love, as a higher-order emotion or passion seems, then, to be out of synch 
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with affect; and yet affect and emotion prove in this case to be mutually reinforcing.47 How does 
the text make sense of these strange bedfellows?  
One reason sickness enhances love for Harrington is because affective resonance lends 
authenticity to emotion. Harrington makes a persistent effort to police emotion and, specifically, 
to distinguish real from fake feeling throughout the novel. As with so much of Harrington’s per-
sonality, this interest stems from his boyhood trauma. Harrington recounts how as a child “about 
six years old” (69) his nurse, Fowler, invented a story about Simon, the Jewish old-clothes man, 
in an attempt to “reduce [Harrington] to passive obedience” (70). Simon is cast as a monster who 
might kidnap and cannibalize Harrington.48 Several critics have analyzed this episode, exploring 
how “Fowler’s pedagogy of terror”49 warps Harrington’s associative imagination and opens a 
psychological wound he struggles thereafter to remedy.50 It is from this nightmare scenario that 
Harrington’s very real anti-Semitism springs. What critics generally do not discuss, however, is 
how out of this episode also springs Harrington’s obsession with distinguishing real from fake. 
Over time, Harrington shows symptoms of insomnia and anxiety. “Between the effects of real 
fear, and the exaggerated expression of it to which I had been encouraged, I was now seriously 
ill,” he remarks (76). While Harrington remains tight lipped about Fowler’s role in the aetiology 
of his condition, his “antipathy to the sight or bare idea of a Jew, was talked of by ladies and by 
gentlemen” (75). In an effort to bring him some relief, Mrs. Harrington pays Simon to leave their 
street out of his circuit. “For some time I slept quietly,” Harrington recalls (79). However, once 
this agreement becomes public knowledge, “the bounty acted directly as an encouragement to 
ply the profitable trade, and ‘Old clothes! Old clothes!’ was heard again punctually under my 
window” (80). The political-economic solution backfires once others learn that Mrs. Harrington 
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will pay Jews to keep away from her son. While initially Harrington assimilates this to his anti-
Semitism, he eventually has to make a correction: 
Jews I should not call them, though such they appeared to be at the time; 
we afterwards discovered that they were good Christian beggars, dressed 
up and daubed for the purpose of looking as frightful and as like the tradi-
tionary representations and vulgar notions of a malicious, revengeful, omi-
nous-looking Shylock as ever whetted his knife. The figures were well got 
up; the tone, accent, and action suited to the parts to be played; the stage 
effect perfect, favoured as it was by the distance at which I saw and 
wished ever to keep such personages; and as money was given by my 
mother’s orders to these people to send them away, they came the more. 
(79)     
Harrington’s fears are exacerbated by fake Jews. His failure to see through these cliché disguises, 
to recognize actors playing roles, proves literally costly. Is it a coincidence, then, that as a man 
Harrington judges others’ and his own moral integrity almost exclusively in terms of affectation?  
 Harrington identifies Lady Anne Mowbray, Mrs. Harrington, and—eventually—his 
friend and Lady Anne’s brother, Lord Mowbray as morally dubious because their self-presenta-
tions are obviously, or subsequently prove to be, insincere. Harrington is, for instance, turned off 
by “the various airs of fashionable affectation which [he] had seen in Lady Anne Mowbray” 
(160). When Lord Mowbray—who is rather more interested in pretend Jews, such as the actress 
who plays Jessica (169)—enters into competition with Harrington for Berenice’s attention, Har-
rington stresses his rival’s inauthenticity: “Mowbray, happy and confident, went on, secure of 
victory. He was an excellent actor, and he was now to act falling in love, which he did by such 
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fine degrees and with a nicety of art which so exquisitely imitated nature, that none but the most 
suspicious or the most practical could have detected the counterfeit” (207). Mowbray well dis-
guises not only his relative indifference to Berenice but his deep anti-Semitism. “The affectation 
was skilfully managed with a dash of his own manner,” Harrington laments: “The counterfeit 
was so exquisite that, notwithstanding my confidence in her father’s penetration and in her talent 
of discerning what was natural and what was affected, I dreaded lest they should both be im-
posed upon” (214). “In his chameleonic powers and mastery of artifice,” says Carol Margaret 
Davidson, Mowbray “assumes the stereotypical role of theatrical Jew.”51 More than that, though, 
Mowbray demonstrates the emotional indifference Denis Diderot thinks is crucial in all success-
ful acting. A good actor, writes Diderot, “must have…penetration and no sensibility…. If the ac-
tor were full, really full, of feeling, how could he play the same part twice running with the same 
spirit and success?… If he is himself while he is playing, how is he to stop being himself?”52 In 
order to play anyone, the actor must be no one—much like Keats’s chameleon poet.  
 For Harrington, precisely what makes Mowbray convincing—though, ultimately, his plot 
is unsuccessful—is what makes him morally bankrupt. When puzzled at Montenero’s displeasure 
with him in one instance, Harrington wonders whether Montenero suspects Harrington of insin-
cerity. This would be, for Harrington, deeply distressing since, above all, “what [Harrington] 
most detested” was “the affectation of taste, sensibility and enthusiasm” (175). In Practical Edu-
cation, the Edgeworths articulate a similar sentiment, imagining how in response to “falsehood 
and affectation” one might justifiably be “disgusted.”53 So, when called by Montenero to look a 
second time at The Dentition of the Jew, Harrington “immediately approached, resolved to stand 
the sight, that I might not be suspected of affectation” (190). If more even than wrong actions it 
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is false displays of feeling that Harrington “most detested,” it is unsurprising that he holds emo-
tional transparency as the key index of ethical behavior. It is precisely this quality in Berenice 
with which Harrington is repeatedly impressed. On a tour of the mint, “what chiefly pleased” 
Harrington was “the sincerity of her attention” and “the judicious proportion of the admiration 
she expressed” (178-9). Berenice’s feelings are measured to her moment and her expression of 
feeling is equal to her actual experience, rather than fashionably hyperbolic. Indeed, what seems 
most to please Harrington in his initial meeting with Berenice in the playhouse is how she delib-
erately resists a display of feeling that might be deemed theatrical:  
I saw the struggle to repress her emotion was often the utmost she could 
endure; and at last I saw, or fancied I saw, that she grew so pale, that, as 
she closed her eyes at the same instant, I was certain she was going to 
faint…. She did not faint; she struggled against it, and it was evident that 
there was no affectation in the case, but on the contrary, an anxious desire 
not to give trouble and a great dread of exposing herself to public observa-
tion. (139-40)  
Berenice here stands in stark contrast to Lady Ann Mowbray, Lord Mowbray, and even an ear-
lier version of Harrington himself. For while Fowler’s stories were the root of Harrington’s 
“Jewish insanity,” he admits to nursing these fears, to affecting even greater anxiety than he did 
have, and bringing on, as a result, an actual phobia (118). Harrington as a child “grew vain of 
[his] fears” and indulged in “affectation and exaggeration” to the point where he “really often did 
not know the difference between [his] own feelings, and the descriptions [he] heard given of 
what [he] felt” (75-6). Against his will, or by force of circumstances, and with “no intention to 
deceive, at least not originally,” Harrington fakes himself into a real psychological and social 
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conflict: “it was a medical, it was a metaphysical wonder, it was an idiosyncrasy, corporeal or 
mental or both” (75). Berenice thus represents the ideal of emotional integrity toward which the 
reformed Harrington strives.  
 Yet Harrington’s feelings are deeply ironic: his sympathy and identity with Berenice is, 
ultimately, phantasmatic. For the plot of the novel does not only concern Harrington’s refor-
mation—or, rather, the inversion of his anti-Semitism through extreme sympathy. It also traces 
Harrington’s relationship with Lord Mowbray, a relationship complicated by conspiracies and 
betrayals. Mowbray, son of Lady de Brantefield, descends from a conspicuously anti-Semitic 
family. One reason for Lady de Brantefield’s interest in the aforementioned Dentition of the Jew, 
for instance, is that it “will be a companion to the old family picture of the Jew and Sir Josseline” 
(184). Indeed, the auction itself is something of a ruse: Mowbray, unbeknownst to either Mon-
tenero or his mother, is the painting’s seller. He has brought it to auction and to his mother’s at-
tention in order to extract money from her—but also to needle Harrington. This scheming antici-
pates Mowbray’s more elaborate misrepresentation of Harrington to the Monteneros. That is, 
Mowbray has woven a narrative around Harrington that casts Harrington’s sincere enthusiasm 
for art and history as well as his love for Berenice as traces of the nervous disorder from which 
he suffered in childhood and never fully recovered. Thus, when Montenero refers to “an obsta-
cle” (288) between Berenice and Harrington preventing their marriage, Harrington mistakes this 
for the difference in religious persuasion: “A difference of religion would be a most formidable 
objection, I grant,” says Montenero, “but we need not enter upon that subject. That is not the ob-
stacle to which I allude” (289). Montenero is concerned, rather, that Harrington is mentally un-
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stable; Mowbray, manipulating Fowler and an apothecary, causes Montenero to read Harring-
ton’s intense affection for his daughter as proof that he continues to suffer “strange fits” and “ex-
traordinary illnesses,” or put simply that Harrington still suffers from “insanity” (285, 284).  
 What this means, then, is that Harrington—in complete ignorance—has been cast within 
a sort of drama. What is more, the affective, embodied aversions Harrington shares with Mr. 
Montenero and Berenice do not dispel but, rather, reinforce the illusion. Indeed, in behaving as 
sincerely as possible, insisting upon his sincerity, and casting artifice as utterly detestable, Har-
rington becomes a complete and profoundly convincing actor. Where Montenero and Berenice 
can see through the excellent counterfeit that is Mowbray and remain immune to Macklin’s 
power—Mowbray, again confusing the authentic and artificial, calls Macklin the “real, original 
Jew of Venice” (114)!—they are totally convinced by Harrington’s flawless performance as “in-
sane.” Harrington’s imitation of madness is masterful, even perhaps graceful, like Heinrich von 
Kleist’s marionette, precisely because the role is performed unconsciously, mechanically. Har-
rington’s aversion to artifice means he seamlessly inhabits the role in which he is cast. In this 
way, Harrington becomes the consummate actor though not, as Diderot recommends, through a 
sentiment bypass but rather through pure, unreflective coincidence with his role. “A sure way to 
act in a cramped, mean style, is to play one’s own character,” says Diderot.54 Harrington, how-
ever, does not commit the error of playing himself because there is no double awareness. Instead, 
he is the absolute embodiment of the method Konstantin Stanislavski would invent toward the 
end of the nineteenth century: Harrington is acting without acting. 
 The irony that Harrington, who is obsessed with authentic displays of emotion, proves to 
be the center of a drama constructed around him is heightened by the late revelation that Bere-
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nice is, in fact, an English Protestant, not a Spanish Jew. As her father explains in the denoue-
ment, “her mother was a Christian, and according to the promise to Mrs. Montenero, Berenice 
has been bred in her faith: a Christian—a Protestant” (290). “Berenice’s suddenly disclosed 
Christianity is a way of converting her,” says Ragussis.55 More than that, though, it also produces 
a powerful, analeptic reaction wherein we must reassess the moment of Harrington’s ostensible 
conversion to Judaism in the theatre, where he seems grafted onto Berenice’s sensorium and to 
experience a transformation when his sympathy is “inverted” by this contact. Moreover, Harring-
ton’s love for Berenice is predicated on her ostensible authenticity, such that the removal of the 
obstacle posed by conflicting faiths would seem to introduce another, even greater obstacle, 
namely, Berenice’s capacity for dissimulation. The person with whom he sympathizes so power-
fully and so physiologically proves not to be what she seems, suggesting that his claim to trans-
cend sympathy and telepathically to feel as her, sees him resonate with a phantom of his own 
conjuring. The very difference from Harrington that Berenice embodies, the difference he osten-
sibly overcomes through hyper-sympathy, proves to be a figment of his imagination summoned 
by her performance. The discovery that Harrington and Berenice share the same faith thus casts 
them apart, into two different categories of dissimulation: Berenice joins those pseudo-Jewish 
characters (Christian beggars, Charles Macklin) who are aware of the gap between role and true 
identity. In contrast to these false fakes stands Harrington: a real fake whose identity coincides so 
entirely with his character that he is both the best and the worst actor alive. Thus, what Kleist 
says of dance might be said of Harrington’s acting: “grace returns after knowledge has gone 
through the world of the infinite, in that it appears to best advantage in that human bodily struc-
ture that has no consciousness at all—or has infinite consciousness—that is, in the mechanical 
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puppet, or in the God.”56 Harrington, as Mowbray’s mechanical puppet, is a sublime forgery: an 
anti-Semite converted to Judaism through his transformative sympathy with…a Christian.   
III: “Morbid Sensibility”   
 Harrington is played, so to speak, not only by Mowbray and Berenice; his own nervous 
anatomy also turns against his sense of identity and works to undermine his efforts at perfect 
transparency, that is, his efforts to present himself only as he is. Again, entirely bypassing will or 
consciousness, Harrington is transformed into an actor at the level of his material, organic consti-
tution. As several eighteenth-century physicians note, nervous illnesses prove difficult to diag-
nose because they present themselves through the mediation of specific organs, making it hard to 
determine whether the organ itself is diseased. Whytt agrees with his predecessor, Thomas Syd-
enham: “As the sagacious Sydenham has justly observed, that the shapes of proteus, or the col-
ours of the chamaeleon, are not more numerous and inconstant, than the variations of the hypo-
chondriac and hysteric disease; so those morbid symptoms which have been commonly called 
nervous are so many, so various, and so irregular, that it would be extremely hard, either rightly 
to describe, or fully to enumerate them.”57 Is a stomach ache the result of indigestion brought 
about by stress in the alimentary canal? Or, is it the result of hypochondriasis, a nervous affecta-
tion of a stomach ache? The pain itself is real in either case. What is different is its source. This 
source, however, is masked by the fact that the same nerves that, when working properly, re-
ceive, mediate, and communicate pain in different parts of the body, might themselves begin ac-
tively generating the experience independently from any disorder in the organs the nerves link 
together. Hence, confusingly, “[a]ll diseases may, in some sense, be called affections of the nerv-
ous system, because in almost every disease the nerves are more or less hurt.”58 
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 Michel Foucault also cites Sydenham in his discussion of the emergence of madness from 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought about nervous illness: “Hysteria thus appears as the 
most real and the most deceptive of diseases; real because it is based upon a movement of the an-
imal spirits; illusory as well, because it generates symptoms that seem provoked by a disorder 
inherent in the organs, whereas they are only the formation, at the level of these organs, of a cen-
tral or rather general disorder.”59 Whytt must have in mind the same passage of Sydenham’s to 
which Foucault points60:  
This disease is not more remarkable for its frequency, than for the numer-
ous forms under which it appears, resembling most of the distempers 
wherewith mankind are afflicted. For in whatever part of the body it be 
seated, it immediately produces such symptoms as are peculiar thereto; so 
that unless the physician be a person of judgement and penetration, he will 
be mistaken, and suppose such symptoms to arise from some essential dis-
ease of this or that particular part, and not from the hysteric passion.61 
Whytt attempts to distinguish nervous disease from “some essential disease of this or that partic-
ular part” by reserving the concept of “nervous illness” for a set of behavioral responses to types 
of pain. A pain can be identified as nervous if it generates not just local discomfort but also an 
emotional supplement. Hence, “[a]n obstruction in the coats of the stomach, or other hypochon-
driac viscera, is not, strictly speaking, a nervous disease; but if the nerves of these parts are so 
changed from their natural state, that low spirits, melancholy, or madness, are the consequence of 
this obstruction, then these symptoms deserve the name of nervous.”62 A disorder is “nervous” 
when it involves an emotional or intellectual disturbance that cannot be accounted for by the up-
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set of the organ alone. Indeed, the implication is that the nerves themselves, acting autono-
mously, imitating a local discomfort, are responsible for generating psychological problems. Psy-
chology thus emerges as nerves minus organs, or where nerves switch from the passive media-
tion to the active generation of experiences. Hence, nervous illness is “a ruse of the body,” is a 
trick where the body pre-reflectively or unconsciously doubles and then plays itself.63 It requires 
a sagacious physician indeed to detect such imposture. So it is no wonder that Harrington fails to 
see this in himself. Indeed, what Diderot says is the actor’s talent reads like a description of nerv-
ous derangement: effective acting consists of “knowing well the outward symptoms of the soul 
we borrow, of addressing ourselves to the sensations of those who hear and see us, of deceiving 
them by the imitation of these symptoms.”64 If some performers have acting in their blood, Har-
rington has it in his nerves.  
 While terms such as “hysteria,” “hypochondria,” and “nervous” occupy center stage for 
Sydenham, Whytt, and Foucault, Edgeworth herself offers a different, though related, term. Two 
characters in Harrington are explicitly diagnosed with “morbid sensibility.” The phrase is signif-
icant precisely because it is used by Edgeworth sparingly and, it seems, strategically, to link to-
gether characters who are in almost every way antipathetic: Mrs. Harrington and Berenice Mon-
tenero. Before looking at how the term is deployed in the novel and the significance of joining 
these characters in this way, it is profitable to track its use in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century medical discourse. What, exactly, was “morbid sensibility” for medical science in the pe-
riod? On the one hand, it seems to describe a deadening of sensation. For instance, John Steven-
son’s A Practical Treatise on the Morbid Sensibility of the Eye, Commonly Called Weakness of 
Sight (1810) makes quite clear that “morbid sensibility” in this instance refers to “the effect of 
exhausted nervous energy” leading to an “excessive weakness of sight.”65 The term describes a 
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deficiency in the nerve that leads to a diminished capacity for sensation: vision deteriorates. On 
the other hand, the term is also deployed in nearly the opposite way. For James Adair, for in-
stance, “morbid sensibility” is a precondition that disposes a subject to nervous disorders: 
though persons of an irritable habit are said to have a peculiar predisposi-
tion to nervous defects, yet by care and management, they may be pre-
served from them: but morbid sensibility, as a praeternatural predisposing 
cause, is really a disease, though this and other similar causes are called 
predisposing; because they exist in the body, and are therefore to be distin-
guished from the occasional causes or non-naturals, and also from the 
proximate cause or disease itself, which consists of predisposing and occa-
sional causes combined.66 
John Aitken agrees when he says that the “proximate cause” of hysteria is “a condition of the 
nerves giving morbid sensibility.”67 In other words, morbid sensibility in these instances refers to 
a nervous system that is hyperactive, that is at risk of overreacting to stimuli like the lunatics 
mentioned in Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria: “so active was their imagina-
tion, that every new object which accidentally struck their senses, awoke to phrenzy their restless 
passions.”68 Robert Bree, in a similar vein, takes morbid sensibility to be a form of excessive 
sensitivity that is also dangerously retentive and self-amplifying. In A Practical Inquiry into Dis-
ordered Respiration (1797) what Bree calls “the morbid sensibility or irritability of the body” en-
crypts “convulsive motions” so that they “return at intervals after the original excitement of them 
had been removed,”69 recalling the intermittent agony of Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner.70 Para-
doxically, then, morbid sensibility names a capacity to feel that is so heightened it can persist 
well beyond the removal of a stimulus. 
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 Edgeworth seems largely to follow this second group of physicians, though she inflects 
the concept in her own way, linking it to the reception and production of antisocial attitudes. 
“You see, I hope, my dear father,” says Berenice, “that I am curing myself of that morbid sensi-
bility, that excessive susceptibility to the opinion of others, with which you used to reproach me. 
I have had some good lessons and you have had some good trials of me since we came to Eng-
land” (212). Berenice admits to the fault of social sensitivity; in Mrs. Coates’s words, she is “a 
little touchy on the Jewish chapter” (182). While sensitivity is a sign of refinement, class, and 
civilization, it also renders one vulnerable to emotional wounds and nervous self-sabotage. 
Hence, for Thomas Totter, insensitivity is correlated both with health and primitive life.71 Oddly, 
as social and cultural refinement increases, subjects become more fragile.72 In a sense, then, 
Montenero advises Berenice to disclaim refinement in order better to cope with the often toxic 
“opinion of others”: “with her feeling heart and strong affection for those she loves, no wonder 
she has often suffered, especially on my account, since we came to England; and she has be-
come, to a fault, tender and susceptible on this point” (145). Like nerves so surcharged that they 
turn against the body, Berenice’s hyper-impressionability recasts sympathy as the conduit 
through which English society consolidates its body at the expense of hers.  
 Matters are more complicated with Mrs. Harrington. Harrington relates that his “mother 
was a woman of weak health, delicate nerves, and a kind of morbid sensibility which [he] often 
heard her deplore as a misfortune, but which [he] observed everybody about her admired as a 
grace” (74). Mrs. Harrington’s overactive nervous system leads her to formulate what she calls 
“presentiments” or prophetic anticipations: “I dreamed last night—but I know you won’t listen to 
dreams—I have a presentiment—but you have no faith in presentiments” (150-1). The term itself 
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is curious since it seems to designate a feeling that precedes feeling. That is, a pre-sentiment sug-
gests that a feeling is imminent, and that we experience that imminence immediately. Yet since 
presentiments also preview the specific feeling to come—the anticipation is evaluative, is “a 
good” or “a bad” feeling—it is as if a presentiment gives one the future feeling early. The appe-
tizer is actually the meal. Where morbid sensibility for Bree made possible feeling’s uncanny re-
turn from the past, Mrs. Harrington’s senses are so heightened that she can feel, ahead of time, 
an emotion or experience that has yet to arrive from the future. Thus, once she learns of Harring-
ton’s interest in the Monteneros, a “dangerous impression” of them comes to her through presen-
timent (151). 
 Harrington describes that his mother’s “nervous state…inclined her now to a variety of 
superstitious feelings—to a belief in presentiments and presages, omens and dreams, added to 
her original belief in sympathies and antipathies” (111). For his mother, sympathies and antipa-
thies are constitutional dispositions. Hence, he hopes that his formation of “a natural sympathy 
with the race of Israel” might convince his mother that his “early prejudice” could be “no natural 
antipathy” (111). Harrington is not allergic to Judaism, he insists. Yet he is unable, through a 
demonstration of his reformed feelings, to gain Mrs. Harrington’s support for his attachment to 
the Monteneros because her presentiments function at three different levels to forestall sympa-
thy. Presentiment, at the level of the physical body, takes form as nervous disease—as hysteria, 
hypochondria, vapors, and the like. In these cases, the nervous system generates experiences, 
producing feeling before, or simply without, sensation. Rather than a system that reacts to, or-
ganizes, and makes sense of empirical data, the diseased nervous system feels in advance of ex-
perience, thus inventing what it registers. Presentiment at the level of the social body takes shape 
as prejudice. Prejudice—literally, to judge in advance—once again sees feeling run ahead of fact 
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or to produce its own facts. Finally, narrative presentiment might be construed as prophecy, the 
attempt to speak in advance of historical events to come. In Mrs. Harrington these dimensions of 
presentiment coalesce in her nervous, prejudicial “prophecies of evil” (231) that then drive her 
effort to dictate with whom Harrington will or will not socialize: “Montenero! Can you think of 
nothing but Mr. Montenero, whom you’ve never seen and never will see?” she shouts (129). 
Mrs. Harrington’s prejudice is thus woven into her body; her racism is as physiological as it is 
ideological—indeed, the two seem hardly separable. 
 Mrs. Harrington’s “morbid sensibility” is the physiological basis for her “presentiments,” 
biologizing her anti-Semitic pre-judgement, or prejudice. Her pre-judgement of the Monteneros 
is somatically encrypted. This is not to suggest that her attitude is natural or inevitable, though. 
What it does mean is that instead of “changing her mind,” Harrington has to induce her to change 
her entire way of feeling, has to convince her to change her tastes and habits. Morbid sensibility 
thus joins a “host of concepts like ‘predisposition,’ ‘arousal,’ and ‘influence’ [that] allowed 
physiologists to have their material entities and to allow for change.”73 If she could alter her en-
vironment and thus her nervous system, she might find herself free from the damage she experi-
ences anticipating disasters. For hers is a weirdly self-fulfilling hysteria in which she experiences 
racial and cultural difference as a “presentiment,” a bad feeling of a bad feeling to come, that 
manages to be both hypothetical and actual, or that manages to arrive in and as its mere anticipa-
tion. That her feelings must originate from her own overactive nervous system becomes clear in 
the novel’s late twist. If Berenice is not, in fact, Jewish but a Spanish Christian, this discovery 
unmasks hyper-sympathy as auto-affection: Mrs. Harrington has been feeling only herself.   
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 Testifying to the political significance of the text’s nervous sympathies, the novel’s reso-
lution is, finally, managed through an affective recalibration of the possible. Most readers, under-
standably, express disappointment with the text’s retreat from a genuinely progressive conclu-
sion in which differences of faith are set aside in the name of love. “Berenice’s ‘conversion’ in 
Harrington may be a sign of Edgeworth’s submission to the ruling ideology,” says Ragussis.74 
For Tessone, “it is exactly Edgeworth’s inability—indeed, failure—to resist this ideologically 
inflected commitment to inheritance that makes Harrington’s unfortunate ending qualify, in 
Edgeworth’s own words, as ‘an Irish blunder, which, with the best intentions, I could not 
avoid.’”75 Judith Page argues, similarly, that “while her stated purpose [with Harrington] is to 
present Jews and Judaism in a favorable light and thus to educate her readership in greater tolera-
tion and benevolence, [Edgeworth] also, it seems, wants to appease or pacify her Christian audi-
ence.”76 At the level of plot, these objections make sense. However, such readings overlook the 
sympathetic symmetry between the theatre house episode in which Harrington inhabits Berenice 
and the financial collapse—or the threat thereof—that frames the conclusion of the romance nar-
rative. It is this crisis that reconfigures what is politically and ideologically possible or impossi-
ble by working on characters’ nerves.  
 The drama in the final chapters of the text centers on an economic anxiety that returns us 
to questions of simulation and dissimulation. Indeed, the attempt to resolve the novel’s conflicts 
by, as it were, reconciling accounts such that Harrington and Berenice can marry proves strik-
ingly inadequate. The financial anxiety that is supposed to absorb—and thus render fungible—
racial and cultural tensions stems from the sudden death of Alderman Coates. Coates, we learn, 
is in significant debt to several creditors, all of whom descend on Baldwin’s bank in—to recall 
Shaftesbury's term—a great “panic”: “it was feared that Baldwin’s bank would not stand the run 
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made on it” (255). This is distressing for the Harringtons because Mr. Harrington has just depos-
ited at this bank a large sum from a recent property sale. While Mr. Harrington heads to the 
bank, his wife descants on the physiological implications of this potential setback: “this would be 
ruin; and everything that vexes him of late brings on directly a fit of the gout—and then you 
know what his temper is! Heaven knows what I had to go through with my nerves and my deli-
cate health during this last fit, which came on the very day after we left you and lasted six weeks, 
and which he sets down to your account, Harrington, and to the account of your Jewess” (255). 
The danger to the bank account exacerbates physical symptoms for which Harrington is held ac-
countable, as the original irritant. Over the course of several hours, Harrington relates how his 
mother’s and his own “anxiety and impatience rose to the highest pitch” (257). In this state of 
heightened sensitivity, they receive his father’s strange report: “He opened [the door], and ad-
vanced towards us without uttering one syllable. ‘All’s lost—and all’s safe,’ said my father” 
(257). This paradoxical assertion neatly summarizes a shift in Mr. Harrington’s feelings, one that 
will, in turn, shift the ground of the Harringtons’ relation to the Monteneros.  
 While being urged by Baldwin not to attempt to withdraw his recent deposit as this would 
certainly exhaust the bank’s resources, Mr. Montenero steps in, offering to insure Mr. Harring-
ton’s funds by pledging the value of his art collection to the bank. This, together with his willing-
ness to cover additional debts to the bank itself incurred by the Coates family, means Montenero 
effectively underwrites the bank. Subtly retuning us to the novel’s key inter-text, this episode re-
vises the socio-economic hostility in The Merchant of Venice. Where Shylock demands payment 
in flesh despite the offer of double or triple his original loan, Montenero willingly risks his for-
tune to sooth the nerves of others.  
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 What is of particular interest, though, is how this resolution, while still clumsy for relying 
on a Jewish deus ex machina, invites us to think about the intersection of illness, finance, and af-
fect. While a full analysis would need to be grounded in Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), in the 
limited context of Harrington, these elements coalesce in the concept of “credit”. That is, in ex-
planation of his paradoxical assertion that “all’s lost and all’s safe,” Mr. Harrington explains that 
while the fortune is safe his credit has been compromised. “‘But if you have not lost your for-
tune,’” says Mrs. Harrington, “‘you have not lost your credit, I presume.’ ‘I have a character as a 
gentleman, Mrs. Harrington.’‘Of course.’ ‘A character for consistency, Mrs. Harrington, to pre-
serve’” (257). His “credit,” here, become a metaphor for the trait of consistency, specifically his 
political dogmatism and reputation for anti-Semitism. It is this consistency that has been under-
mined by his dealings with Montenero via the bank: “Then I can tell you, Mrs. Harrington, your 
nerves have a great deal to bear yet. What will your nerves feel, madam? What will your enthusi-
asm say, sir, when I tell you, that I have lost my heart to—a Jewess?” (258).  
 Mr. Harrington’s sympathy with the Monteneros is cast in language that blends together 
finance, character, and feeling. Love manifests itself in and as an economic setback; his altered 
orientation to the Monteneros is a product of transpersonal economic forces recalibrating his 
sense of credibility, forces that he realizes will bear directly on his wife’s nerves. Instead of 
changing his mind through contemplation or rational reflection on Montenero’s generosity, the 
novel persistently imagines this changing relationship in terms of forces that operate sub-con-
sciously, corporeally, even ontologically (insofar as Mr. Harrington’s identity has been rede-
fined). Whereas in the theatre house, Harrington’s sympathy circulated through nervous telepa-
thy, through a commingling of morbid sensibilities, in this final episode, sympathy circulates 
through economic and financial media that bypass reason or reflection, striking, rather, at the 
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heart of nervous feeling. What, then, does this say about the capacity for sympathy to ameliorate 
social and political tensions, to overcome prejudice, or to transcend religious difference? How 
does the physiological form of sympathy transform the body’s nervous activity into a political 
theatre?  
 The embodiment of feeling as affect might seem to offer an escape from the deceptions 
of prejudice or ideology. Harrington’s visceral sympathy with Mr. Montenero and Berenice ap-
pears, initially, as a corrective to the anti-Semitic attitudes with which Harrington is poisoned as 
a child. Economic anxiety seems, similarly, to spur a revolution in the feelings of Mr. and Mrs. 
Harrington. The body appears to deliver a materiality and a reality that puts characters in touch 
with a pre-political logic of sense. For instance, Harrington ostensibly discovers that his body is 
philo-Semitic, even actually Jewish, in spite of his ancestry and original prejudice. However, 
what we see instead is that biology offers no such stable ground. The body is radically nervous, 
and nerves are by no means neutral, pre-political media for the propagation of feelings. Instead, 
we discover bodies that, in their autonomic, non-conscious operation—in their very anatomy—
are already performing certain kinds of identities. These identities take shape outside of the sub-
ject’s self-consciousness and, to a degree, beyond deliberate self-stylization. Again, Harrington’s 
ironic performance as insane is delivered non-consciously. Embodied identities are, then, not 
simply scripted biologically but produced through the warp and woof of an imagination en-
fleshed in the nervous system itself. Instead of serving as the immutable material substrate for a 
mutable person understood, primarily, in psychological terms, the body is constantly performing 
itself and performing the self. This collapses the dualism that persists in any analysis of identity, 
politics, or culture focused on epistemology—on what or how subjects know. Instead, as Har-
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rington suggests, in late eighteenth-century literature and thought, sympathy invents its own the-
ory of affect, one that emerges most forcefully through nervous illnesses that blur the boundaries 
of body and mind.  
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